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Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception
(Forthcoming, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (2017))
Peter J. Smith* and Robert W. Tuttle**
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court recognized a
ministerial exception to the ordinary rules of employer liability. The
Court also concluded that the exception operates as an affirmative
defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. This conclusion raises quite
significant questions about how courts should address the exception in
the course of litigation.
We argue that courts should approach these procedural questions
in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial exception. The
exception reflects a longstanding constitutional limitation on the
competence of courts to resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical”
questions. To conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative
defense does not alter this fundamental limitation on the authority of
secular courts.
As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between
religious institutions and their employees, courts may be required to
manage discovery to resolve threshold questions about the application
of the ministerial exception before permitting broader discovery.
Similarly, courts should consider permitting interlocutory appeals of
trial court decisions that deny motions for summary judgment based on
the exception. And courts not only should conclude that religious
institutions do not waive the defense by failing to raise it, but also ought
to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the exception may
apply. These departures from the ordinary treatment of affirmative
defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional principles that the
Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.
I. INTRODUCTION

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
Berz Research Professor of Law & Religion, George Washington University Law
School.

*

**

In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1 the Court for the first
time recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception” to the
ordinary rules of liability arising out of the employment relationship
between clergy and religious institutions. The Court concluded that the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “bar the government from
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its
ministers.” 2 As a consequence, a minister generally cannot recover
from her religious employer for employment discrimination or related
claims. Although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor declined to articulate a
clear test for determining when an employee is a minister, it concluded
that the plaintiff in the suit was a minister for purposes of the
exception. 3
Before the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the lower courts
had divided over whether the ministerial exception deprived courts of
subject matter jurisdiction to consider a ministerial employee’s claims
or instead operated as a defense to liability. 4 The Court resolved this
debate in a footnote in its opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. 5 The Court
declared that the exception operates as an affirmative defense, rather
than as a jurisdictional bar. 6 In this paper, we address both the
underlying justification for this conclusion and its practical
consequences.
To understand the significance of these questions, it is useful to
consider a hypothetical suit. Imagine that an African-American, female
minister served a congregation for several years without any
complaints. With virtually no notice, the church council, composed
exclusively of white men, recently voted to fire her, pursuant to their
authority under the church’s governing documents. They explained to
the minister that they were terminating her because of the poor
quality of her sermons and their perception that her prayers
increasingly departed from settled doctrines of the faith tradition. The
discharged minister responded by filing a claim with the local office of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
Id. at 181.
3 Id. at 190 (“We are reluctant [to] adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an
employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the
circumstances of her employment.”).
4 See infra at notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
5 565 U.S. at 195 n.4.
6 Id.
1
2

2

discrimination on the basis of race and gender. The EEOC declined to
become involved in the suit and granted the minister a “right-to-sue”
letter. She then filed suit in federal district court seeking back pay,
reinstatement, and attorney’s fees.
In a typical employment discrimination suit, where the plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer can
respond by offering a non-discriminatory justification for the adverse
employment action. The plaintiff can then argue that the employer’s
proffered justification is pre-textual, and the finder of fact must
determine the actual basis for the adverse employment decision. 7
Matters are more complicated when the defendant is a religious
organization. Title VII, and comparable state-law protections against
employment discrimination, provides that religious organizations are
not bound by the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
religion. 8 Accordingly, an avowed atheist cannot recover under Title
VII for religious discrimination when a church refuses to hire him,
even if the position is not one that involves leading worship, religious
education, or any other religious activity. 9
In our hypothetical suit, the plaintiff does not allege that she
was fired for religious reasons, nor could she successfully maintain
such an action against the church. But Title VII, like comparable state
provisions, does not exempt religious organizations from the general
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
national origin, or the other protected characteristics under the
statute.
If there were no ministerial exception to liability under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, then the plaintiff could force the defendant to
articulate a non-discriminatory basis for her termination. If the
plaintiff could satisfy her initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case of race or gender discrimination, the burden would shift to the
church to articulate a non-discriminatory basis for the decision. In our
example, the church likely would defend by citing the council’s
conclusion that she was a poor preacher and deviated from settled
church doctrine. The plaintiff would respond by arguing that those
reasons were pre-textual, which she would seek to demonstrate by
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (“This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”
9 See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
7
8
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offering evidence that her preaching was adequate and that her
prayers and teaching conformed to church doctrine.
To resolve such a dispute, a court would inevitably be required
to decide whether the plaintiff was an adequate preacher and whether
her teaching and prayers were sufficiently orthodox. But even before
Hosanna-Tabor, there was a long and unbroken constitutional
tradition that prohibits courts from resolving “strictly ecclesiastical”
questions, 10 and it is difficult to imagine a more purely ecclesiastical
question than the quality or substance of a minister’s preaching and
teaching. As we explain below, this is the strongest theoretical and
constitutional justification for the ministerial exception.
But even assuming the existence of such an exception,
important questions remain in suits by church employees against the
church. As in Hosanna-Tabor, it may be unclear whether the employee
should be treated as a minister for purposes of the exception. In
addition, as we discuss below, some claims by employees properly
considered ministers might nevertheless be the basis for recovery
notwithstanding the exception.
This state of affairs raises several procedural questions in suits
potentially implicating the ministerial exception. To return to our
example, imagine that the plaintiff were not an ordained pastor, but
instead was the publicist for a large church congregation, responsible
for designing and editing the church’s many publications and for
maintaining the church’s elaborate website. 11 It would not be
immediately obvious whether she is a minister within the meaning of
the exception. If she sued for race and gender discrimination after
being terminated, and the church responded by raising the ministerial
exception, what mechanism should the court use to decide whether the
exception insulates the church from liability?
We focus in this paper on five important questions of procedure
that can arise in a suit implicating the ministerial exception. First,
does the religious organization properly assert the exception by way of
a motion to dismiss, or may it only raise the defense in its answer and
then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for summary
judgment? Second, if the matter is not properly resolved at the motion
to dismiss stage, should a defense based on the ministerial exception
require the court to limit the scope of discovery to matters relevant to
10 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-49
(1969).
11 Cf. Alicia-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6877
(involving similar facts).
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the application of the exception prior to permitting discovery on other
issues in the suit? Third, if the court denies a church’s motion based on
the exception, can the church take an immediate appeal, or must it
defer any appeal until entry of final judgment? Fourth, if disputed
questions of fact concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot
be resolved at the summary judgment stage—for example, if there is a
genuine dispute about the actual responsibilities of the plaintiff’s
position—can those questions be submitted to and resolved by a jury,
or must they be resolved by the judge? Fifth, if the defendant fails to
raise the defense, either in the answer or later in the proceeding, may
or should the court raise the ministerial exception sua sponte, or
should the court instead treat the defense as waived?
These questions must be resolved in light of the underlying
justification for the ministerial exception. We begin in Part II by
considering the exception’s origins in the lower federal courts. We then
discuss the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor and seek to identify the
ultimate constitutional basis for the ministerial exception. We then
turn in Part III to the procedural questions raised by suits implicating
the exception.
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
A. Judicial Origins of the Ministerial Exception
By the time the Court decided Hosanna-Tabor, every federal
circuit and many state supreme courts had recognized the ministerial
exception. In the first decision to apply the exception, McClure v.
Salvation Army, 12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered a gender discrimination claim by a female employee
of the Salvation Army who had been terminated. Although Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act protected the defendant against claims of religious
discrimination, by its terms it did not offer immunity from claims of
discrimination based on membership in other protected classes. The
Salvation Army argued, however, that Billie McClure was not an
ordinary employee of the organization; instead, she was an ordained
minister of that faith group. The Salvation Army argued that the court
should read the term “employee” in Title VII to exclude ministerial
employees. The court agreed, construing the statute in light of

12

460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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constitutional concerns that would arise from extending the statute to
these circumstances. 13 The court reasoned:
“The relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief
instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its
purpose. Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical
concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a minister
is a matter of church administration and government, so
are the functions which accompany such a selection. It is
unavoidably true that these include the determination of
a minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty
he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious mission
of the church.” 14
The Court’s holding was based on the “nonspecific wording” 15 of the
statute, but in identifying the relevant constitutional concerns, the
Court cited both Religion Clauses. 16 The bulk of its analysis, however,
focused on a series of cases that we discuss below and that, we
contend, sound primarily in Establishment Clause themes. 17
Although the Fifth Circuit addressed several issues related to
the exception in the decade after McClure, no other federal circuit
expressly adopted the ministerial exception during that time period.
This is undoubtedly due at least in part to the fact that very few
Protestant denominations permitted the ordination of women before
the mid-1970s, and it took some number of years for women to
complete seminary before entering the workplace as ministers. Once
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 558-59.
15 Id. at 560.
16 Id. at 558 (describing question presented as, “Does the application of the provisions
of Title VII to the relationship between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure (a
church and its minister) violate either of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment?”); id. (noting the “‘wall of separation’ between church and State” and
citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), an Establishment Clause
case); id. (noting that “Restrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only
when it is necessary ‘to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
state may lawfully protect’ (quoting West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)) and citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a
Free Exercise Clause case).
17 Id. at 559-60 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, (1969)). See infra at notes 58-93 and
accompanying text.
13
14
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this development took hold, the courts were confronted with more
claims of employment discrimination by religious employers. 18
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit recognized the ministerial exception
in Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists. 19 As in
McClure, the court relied on both Religion Clauses in concluding that
the exception limits liability under Title VII. 20 In addition, the case
involved a complicating factor not present in McClure: the plaintiff was
not an ordained minister. Instead, she was a “associate in pastoral
care” at a church. 21 The court held, however, that the ministerial
exception “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of
the position.” 22 Because the plaintiff’s position was “important to the
spiritual and pastoral mission of the church,” the court concluded that
Rayburn performed the functions of a ministerial employee for
purposes of the exception. 23 The court emphasized the limited
character of judicial inquiry in this context: “While it is our duty to
determine whether the position of associate in pastoral care is
important to the spiritual mission of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, we may not then inquire whether the reason for Rayburn's
rejection had some explicit grounding in theological belief.” 24
Rayburn applied the ministerial exception to an employee who
had not been ordained, but whose functions were substantially similar
to those performed by ordained ministers. Subsequent decisions
expanded even further the category of employees subject to the
exception. For example, in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, North Carolina, 25 the court held that a director of music
ministry at Sacred Hearth Cathedral was a ministerial employee. The
18 Several commentators criticized the ministerial exception, in large part because of
its effect on women’s rights in the workplace. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above
the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from AntiDiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield
Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to
Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994).
19 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1986).
20 Id. at 1168 (“Any attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice of its
leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights.”); id. at 116970 (“To subject church employment decisions of the nature we consider today to Title
VII scrutiny would also give rise to “excessive government entanglement” with
religious institutions prohibited by the establishment clause of the First
Amendment” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
21 Id. at 1168-69.
22 Id. at 1168.
23 Id. at 1169.
24 Id. at 1169.
25 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).
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plaintiff’s “primary duties at the Cathedral and its school consisted of
the selection, presentation, and teaching of music, which is integral to
the spiritual and pastoral mission of the Catholic Church and many
other religious traditions ….” 26 Similarly, in Alicia-Hernandez v.
Archdiocese of Chicago, 27 the court applied the exception to a claim by
the Archdiocese’s communications manager. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff was responsible “for promoting the church and spreading
its message within the Hispanic community” and for acting “as a
liaison between the church and [those] it [seeks] to reach.” 28
At the same time, courts expanded the ministerial exception to
reach all class-based protections under Title VII (except those related
to sexual harassment) 29 and other federal employment discrimination
statutes. 30 Courts have also applied the exception to bar certain statelaw claims, including defamation claims arising out of a minister’s
employment by a church 31 and breach of contract claims by terminated
ministers. 32 The courts in these cases reasoned that the exception
applies to all claims by ministerial employees that would require the
court to resolve specifically religious questions about the employee’s
performance in or fitness for the position. 33
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 34 which strictly limited
Id. at 797.
2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6877.
28 Id. at *13 (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 121 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1340 (D.Col.
2000), aff’d 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002)).
29 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 16063 (2009) (arguing that courts can adjudicate sexual harassment claims by ministers
if “the injury attributable to sexual harassment can be separated from the
defendants’ evaluation of her performance and termination of her position”); infra at
notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
30 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying
ministerial exception to claim by church music director under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying
exception to claim by ordained minister under Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
31 Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying
ministerial exception to bar defamation seeking damages for injury to reputation
arising from discharge from a ministerial position).
32 Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, D.C. App. Lexis 656 (2002) (applying ministerial
exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by ordained minister who was
terminated by the congregation).
33 See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54
(breach of contract cases); 160-63 (sexual harassment cases).
34 485 U.S. 660 (1990).
26
27
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claims of religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, some
commentators questioned whether the ministerial exception should
survive. 35 The D.C. Circuit, however, squarely held that Smith had no
impact on the availability of the exception. Indeed, in EEOC v.
Catholic University of America, 36 the court raised the ministerial
exception sua sponte after the defendant failed to raise it as a defense
to gender discrimination claims arising out of a tenure denial by a
professor of canon law. 37
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hosanna-Tabor,
there was no circuit split about the existence of the ministerial
exception. 38 There was, however, a split among the federal circuit
courts, and among state courts, about the correct procedures for
resolving cases involving the exception. Specifically, the lower courts
had divided over how to raise and resolve a defense based on the
exception. Some courts had concluded that the exception operated as a
jurisdictional bar. 39 On this view, the conclusion that the ministerial
exception applied required dismissal of the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Courts that followed this approach reasoned that
because courts lack competence to decide ecclesiastical questions, they
must lack power to decide cases implicating the ministerial
exception. 40 In those courts, the proper means of raising a defense
based on the exception, like any other defense of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, was generally by motion to dismiss. 41
Other courts had held that the ministerial exception did not
operate as a jurisdictional bar, because federal district courts clearly
have “authority to review claims arising under federal law.” 42 These
courts treated the exception as an affirmative defense to liability
See, e.g., Brant, supra note 18, at 309-10.
83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
37 Id. at 459-60.
38 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
39 See Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 188 (7th
Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of suit by a
ministerial employee against a church). For the theoretical underpinnings of this
view, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause:
Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of
the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (arguing that the exception
operates as a jurisdictional bar to preserve church autonomy).
40 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038–1039 (7th Cir. 2006).
41 See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his
Circuit has treated the “ministerial exception” as jurisdictional in nature and an
appropriate ground for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”); Tomic, 442
F.3d at 1038.
42 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
35
36
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rather than as a bar to jurisdiction. 43 But even these courts were
divided over the correct procedure for raising and resolving the
defense. Some courts held that religious organizations could raise the
exception in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 44 Because the question whether the exception applied in a
given case often turned on disputed factual issues, courts that treated
the exception as an affirmative defense often permitted discovery
before resolving the defendant’s motion. But those courts disagreed
further over the appropriate scope of discovery in such cases. Some
invited the parties to engage in limited discovery focused exclusively
on the application of the ministerial exception. 45 In those courts, the
parties typically followed this limited discovery by submitting
affidavits about the employee’s responsibilities. The court would then
entertain a motion for summary judgment by the defendant based on
the exception. 46 Other courts treated the defense like any other
affirmative defense and declined to limit discovery at the threshold to
the question whether the employee was properly considered a
minister. 47 In these courts, general discovery, including discovery on
the application of the exception, would proceed, and the exception
would be simply one of many possible grounds for an eventual motion
for summary judgment. 48
B. The Court’s Decision in Hosanna-Tabor

Bollard v. California Province of Soc. of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 (“[W]e conclude that the exception does not act as a
jurisdictional bar, but rather, is best viewed as a challenge to the sufficiency of [the
plaintiff’s] claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”); accord Bryce v. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002); Bollard v. Cal. Province of
the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999); Natal v. Christian & Missionary
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989).
45 See, e.g., Schmoll v. Chapman University, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1437-39, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 426, 428-29 (1999).
46 Id. at 428 (“In light of this uncontroverted evidence, the court granted summary
judgment to Chapman, finding the university constitutionally protected against state
interference with its employment decision affecting Schmoll.”).
47 See, e.g., Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against
Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 975 N.E.2d 433 (2012) (reversing pre-Hosanna-Tabor
trial court decision that enjoined state equal employment commission investigation of
age discrimination claim by religious school teacher).
48 975 N.E.2d at 441 (rejecting view that “the First Amendment requires all discovery
to be stayed until the affirmative defense of ministerial exception is fully
adjudicated”).
43
44
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In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court considered both the substance and
the procedure of the ministerial exception. We consider them in turn.
1. Finding a Ministerial Exception
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court for the first time embraced the
ministerial exception. The Court noted that the lower courts had
“uniformly recognized the existence” of the exception to preclude
adjudication of most discrimination claims arising out of “the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its
ministers.” 49 The Court agreed that with those courts that its prior
decisions “confirm that it is impermissible for the government to
contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” 50
After an extensive review of the historical and doctrinal basis for
the exception, the Court turned to whether the plaintiff was properly
considered a minister. Even though she was a teacher of
predominantly secular subjects, and had only limited religious duties,
the Court concluded that she counted as a minister for purposes of the
exception. 51 Although the Court expressly declined to announce a
specific test for defining ministers, 52 the Court’s conclusion that the
plaintiff was a minister suggests that it applied a rather capacious
definition of the role. 53 In addition, eight members of the Court agreed
that defining ministers for purposes of the exception is a task properly
565 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 185.
51 Id. at 190-95.
52 Id. at 190 (“We are reluctant [to] adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an
employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the
circumstances of her employment.”).
53 The Court described Cheryl Perich’s responsibilities as follows:
“Respondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna–Tabor as a lay
teacher in 1999. After Perich completed her colloquy later that school year,
Hosanna–Tabor asked her to become a called teacher. Perich accepted the
call and received a “diploma of vocation” designating her a commissioned
minister. Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna–
Tabor and fourth grade during the 2003–2004 school year. She taught math,
language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music. She also taught a
religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional
exercises each day, and attended a weekly school-wide chapel service. Perich
led the chapel service herself about twice a year.”
Id. at 178. The Court relied on several features of Perich’s position in concluding that
she was a minister: “the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions
she performed for the Church.” Id. at 192.
49
50
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performed by courts reviewing claims within the reach of the
exception. 54 Those eight Justices implicitly rejected Justice Thomas’s
suggestion that the mere invocation of the exception by a religious
organization precludes further judicial inquiry. 55
The Court based its recognition of the ministerial exception on
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Court
explained: “By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the
Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape
its own faith and mission through its appointments. Granting the state
the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful
also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.” 56 Accordingly, the Court
repeatedly stated that the ministerial exception is “grounded in the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” 57
A close reading of the case reveals, however, that Establishment
Clause concerns predominate. 58 Although the Court certainly
54 565 U.S. at 190-95 (opinion for a unanimous Court) (considering the employee’s
responsibilities and determining whether she was properly considered a minister for
purposes of the exception); id. at 204-05 (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Kagan, J.)
(concluding that the employee was a minister for purposes of the exception because
she “played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and
as a leader of its worship activities”). The Court concluded, however, that courts
should not consider whether the religious institution’s justification for the adverse
employment action was sincerely religious or instead pretextual. For an explanation
of this conclusion, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1265, 1279-80 (2017).
55 Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the Religion Clauses require
civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”). Justice
Thomas reasoned that “the Religion Clauses guarantee religious organizations
autonomy in matters of internal governance, including the selection of those who will
minister the faith. A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be
hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the organization's sincere
determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ under the organization’s
theological tenets.” Id. at 196-97.
56 Id. at 188-89.
57 Id. at 189; see id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); id. at
189 (“We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing
to say about a religious organization's freedom to select its own ministers.”); id. at
194 (“The EEOC and Perich originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her
former position as a called teacher. By requiring the Church to accept a minister it
did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under
the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”).
58 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1280-1287.
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identified religious liberty as one reason for finding a ministerial
exception, the case law on which the decision rests, as well as the
Court’s reasoning, makes clear its focus on the problem of
governmental resolution of quintessentially religious questions. The
line of cases on which the Court relied stretches back to Watson v.
Jones, 59 a federal common-law decision in which the Court required
judicial deference to decisions made by the highest body within the
Presbyterian Church. The dispute concerned the ownership of property
of the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky. The Court, invoking a “broad
and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system
of laws,” deferred to the decision of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church awarding ownership to one of the competing
factions. 60
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, 61 the Court adopted Watson’s reasoning as a
matter of constitutional doctrine under the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses. 62 Kedroff involved a dispute between a local Russian
Orthodox congregation in New York and the church hierarchy in
Moscow over control of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in New York
and the appointment of church leaders in the United States. 63 The
state legislature had enacted a law that required every Russian
Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination of the
governing body of the North American churches as authoritative. 64 The
New York Court of Appeals relied on the law in ruling against the

80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871).
Id. at 727.
61 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
62 Id. at 115-16 (noting that the Court decided Watson “before judicial recognition of
the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the
First Amendment against state action,” but that “[f]reedom to select the clergy,
where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have
federal constitutional protection …”).
63 Id. at 95-97.
64 Id. at 97-99. The law at issue was Article 5-C of the Religious Corporations Law of
New York. “The purpose of the article was to bring all the New York churches,
formerly subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing
Synod in Moscow or the Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively autonomous
metropolitan district. That district was North American in area, created pursuant to
resolutions adopted at a sobor held at Detroit in 1924. This declared autonomy was
made effective by a further legislative requirement that all the churches formerly
administratively subject to the Moscow synod and patriarchate should for the future
be governed by the ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan
district.” Id. at 98.
59
60
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Russian Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow, 65 but the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court held that civil government must not usurp church
authority to decide “strictly ecclesiastical” matters. 66 Because of the
structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Court ruled, such
decisions belong to the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian
Orthodox Church. 67 The Court thus invalidated the state law that
purported to resolve the intra-church dispute. 68
The Court reaffirmed this approach, albeit in a quite different
denominational context, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church. 69 Blue Hull
involved the effort of a majority of a congregation to split from the
denominational body, because of the denominational body’s liberal
stances on school prayer, the role of women in the church, and the
Vietnam War. 70 At root, the conflict was over ownership of church
property. 71 The Georgia trial court held that the denomination had
departed from traditional Presbyterian doctrine, and therefore that the
congregation had the right to claim the property upon its departure
from the denomination. 72 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, 73
but U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that courts are not
competent to decide what constitutes fidelity to the doctrines of a
particular faith. 74 The Court explained that “First Amendment values
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn
on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine
and practice.” 75 Accordingly, “the First Amendment enjoins the
employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes”

65 See St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America v.
Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 33, 96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (1950).
66 Id. at 119.
67 Id. at 115.
68 Id. at 119.
69 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
70 Id. at 442 & n.1.
71 Id. at 441-43.
72 Id. at 443-44 (“[T]he jury was instructed to determine whether the actions of the
general church ‘amount to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original
tenets and doctrines of the (general church), so that the new tenets and doctrines are
utterly variant from the purposes for which the (general church) was founded.’”).
73 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian
Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
74 Id. at 445-56 (stating that it is “wholly inconsistent with the American concept of
the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine
ecclesiastical questions”).
75 Id. at 449.
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and “commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without
resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.” 76
The Court returned to this principle in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese of North America v. Milivojevich, 77 which involved
the efforts of U.S.-based bishop Milivojevich to resist the authority of
the Belgrade-based church hierarchy. The hierarchy had restricted the
size of Milivojevich’s jurisdiction. When he vehemently resisted, the
hierarchy removed him from his position. 78 Milivojevich filed suit in
Illinois state court, claiming (among other things) that the church had
failed to follow its internal procedures for removal of a bishop. The
Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Milivojevich and ordered him
restored to his diocese and the diocese restored to its original size. 79
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts lack authority
to resolve “quintessentially religious controversies.” 80 The Court stated
that when “hierarchical religious organizations” adjudicate disputes
over internal discipline and church governance, “the Constitution
requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon
them.” 81
Jones v. Wolf also involved a dispute between competing factions
over church property. 82 The Court clarified that state and federal
courts are not always bound to defer to the hierarchy of a particular
denomination in resolving a dispute within a religious body. Instead,
the Court said that “a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property
dispute.” 83 By neutral principles, the Court meant “objective, wellestablished concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges.” 84 But the Court also imposed an important limit on the use of
“neutral principles” to resolve intra-church disputes: “If in such a case
the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the
civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer

Id.
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
78 Id. at 702-06.
79 Id. at 708; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and
Canada v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975).
80 426 U.S. at 720.
81 Id. at 725.
82 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
83 Id. at 604.
84 Id. at 603.
76
77
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to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body.” 85
Although these cases cited the First Amendment in general,
rather than relying separately on the Establishment Clause or the
Free Exercise Clause, 86 the Court’s core argument in each case must be
based on the Establishment Clause. First, in none of these cases did
the Court suggest that a balancing of interests would be appropriate in
resolving the disputes. 87 In the middle of the twentieth century, when
the Court decided Blue Hull and Milivojevich, such balancing was a
hallmark of decision under the Free Exercise Clause. 88 In Free
Exercise cases in that era, the Court measured the interference with
religious liberty against the state’s interest in regulating the matter in
question. 89 But the Court made clear in Blue Hull and Milivojevich
that the prohibition on adjudication of religious questions is categorical
and not contingent on the relative strength of the government’s reason
for intervention. 90 In Establishment Clause cases, by contrast, the
Court never considers whether an alleged violation of the Clause is
outweighed by some governmental interest advanced by the challenged
Id. at 604; accord at 602 (“As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment
requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or
polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”).
86 See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 100 n.5; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 450; Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 698, 709-10.
87 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1276.
88 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to act
[under the Free Exercise Clause] must have appropriate definition to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom.”); id. at 308 (noting that the “state of Connecticut has an obvious interest in
the preservation and protection of peace and good order within her borders” and
inquiring “whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest, means to which end
would, in the absence of limitation by the federal Constitution, lie wholly within the
State’s discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come
into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact”);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (determining “whether some compelling
state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right” under
the Free Exercise Clause).
89 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
90 See Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 (“[T]he First Amendment enjoins the employment of
organs of government for essentially religious purposes.”); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
713 (“[T]his is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of
such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are
not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”).
85
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action. Instead, the Court simply asks whether the challenged action is
one subject to categorical prohibition.
For example, the Court’s cases addressing prayer or religious
exercises in public schools do not consider the state’s interest in
fostering such piety. 91 The mere fact of state-sponsored religious
indoctrination renders such conduct impermissible. Similarly, state
funding of worship or religious indoctrination—such as the purchase of
Bibles for distribution to Christian congregations—would violate the
Establishment Clause regardless of the state’s purported interest in
promoting morality in the citizenry through Bible study. 92 The same is
true when the government displays quintessentially religious symbols
with the purpose of endorsing religion. 93
Second, all of the cases cited above focused narrowly on the
religious character of the questions presented to the lower courts. In
each of the decisions from Watson through Jones, the Supreme Court
held that governmental bodies, including courts, lack the competence
to resolve strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions. Although the
indirect consequence of this approach is a zone of freedom for churches
in their decision-making, the Court’s primary focus was on the secular
character of civil government and its lack of authority and capacity to
resolve quintessentially religious disputes. The assertion of such
jurisdiction had been a hallmark of many colonial courts in the preRevolutionary era, and particularly in states with established
churches. 94 But this relationship between religious organizations and
the state has been soundly rejected by courts and other institutions of
civil government since the founding era.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor relied squarely on the line of cases
starting with Watson in concluding that the ministerial exception
91 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (agreeing with the petitioners’
argument that “the State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system
breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State” because
“the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by government”).
92 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that laws that provided
direct public funds for religious education violated the Establishment Clause).
93 McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860
(2005) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible
object is to take sides.”).
94 James H. Hutson, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES
(2007).
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exists. 95 Those cases stand for the proposition that certain questions
are simply beyond the authority of secular civil government to decide.
The ministerial exception should be understood and applied in light of
that proposition. In other words, the exception does not recognize a
broad autonomy for religious institutions; instead, it reflects only a
specific limitation on the power of government to resolve certain
ecclesiastical matters. In this sense, the limitation is primarily
imposed by the Establishment Clause, even if it also promotes
interests within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.
Some commentators have invoked Jones v. Wolf to suggest that
the Establishment Clause principle does not impose a categorical limit
on adjudication of religious questions, and specifically of employment
discrimination claims by ministers. 96 We think this is mistaken. First,
the Court in Hosanna-Tabor squarely rejected this view, and in any
event did not even cite Jones. Second, the Court’s focus in Jones on
neutral principles confirms that the government lacks competence to
resolve certain types of religious questions. As the Court stated in
Jones, “the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving
church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and
practice.” 97 Indeed, courts may decline to defer to church hierarchies
when neutral principles are available only because such principles
enable courts to resolve controversies without reference to church
doctrine.
Third, the Court in Jones was primarily concerned about
property disputes, which often involve documents (such as deeds) and
state-law presumptions that judges can interpret and apply without
reference to religious doctrine. Disputes arising out of the employment
context, on the other hand, often require much more nuanced judicial
assessment of the employee’s conduct, which must be measured
against the employer’s standard of proper performance. That standard,
when applied to a ministerial employee, virtually always involves some
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor cited and discussed Watson, Kedroff, and
Milivojevich. See 565 U.S. at 185-87.
96 Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1001 (2013)
(disagreeing with those who argue that judicial inquiry into pretext by a religious
employer would require resolution of “a theological dispute”; arguing that such a
view “ignores not only the courts’ regular examination of religious motivation but
also their authorized use of ‘neutral principles of law’ to resolve church property
disputes” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), for the proposition that “a court
may review church deeds, charters, constitutional provisions, and other documents
as long as it interprets them in purely secular terms”)).
97 Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese of North Am. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)).
95
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question of religious fitness for the position. As a consequence, there
generally will not be any neutral—which is to say, secular— principles
that courts can apply to resolve such questions. (This probably
explains why the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not bother to discuss
Jones.)
The lower courts’ approach to the ministerial exception—both
before and after Hosanna-Tabor—confirms that the exception derives
principally from the Establishment Clause, rather than from notions of
church autonomy implicit in most Free-Exercise-Clause-based claims.
First, the courts that recognized the exception before the decision in
Hosanna-Tabor uniformly relied on the line of cases holding that
courts lack competence to adjudicate purely religious questions. 98
Second, the lower courts have concluded that the ministerial exception
does not defeat certain types of claims by ministers against their
religious employers. Courts can grant relief on those claims because
their resolution does not require determination of any ecclesiastical
questions.
For example, the lower courts that have addressed the issue
have uniformly concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar
sexual harassment claims under Title VII. 99 Those courts have
reasoned that such claims do not require any inquiry into the
minister’s fitness for the position, but instead turn on the workplace
conduct of the minister’s co-workers. 100 Similarly, the lower courts
have concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar certain
breach of contract claims. 101 When ministers sue after termination
seeking to recover unpaid wages, courts typically resolve the claims

98 See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 559-60 (citing Watson, Kedroff, and Blue Hull);
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68 (citing Kedroff and Milivojevich).
99 See e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715; 1991 Minn. App. Lexis 635; McKelvey v.
Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002); Morgan v. Central Baptist Church of Oak
Ridge, 2013 WL 12043468 (E.D. Tenn.).
100 See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[W]hat is left open … is a restricted, secular inquiry: whether Elvig can carry her
burden of proving she was sexually harassed and, if she can, whether the Church can
prove its affirmative defense. ‘Nothing in the character of [the inquiry] will require ...
evaluat[ion of] religious doctrine or the ‘reasonableness' of the religious practices
followed [by the church].’ The reasonableness component of the … affirmative defense
evaluates an employer's actions in responding to sexual harassment rather than the
motivations for that response.” (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950)); see also Lupu &
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 160-63.
101 See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310-12.
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and, when appropriate, award relief. 102 Such claims do not require any
judicial determination of a minister’s fitness for office, and accordingly
are not barred by the exception.
If the ministerial exception derived principally from concerns
about church autonomy, sexual harassment and breach of contract
claims would likely be barred. After all, resolution of such claims
requires judicial inquiry into the relationship between a religious
organization and its employees. The cases concluding that the
ministerial exception does not always defeat such claims flow naturally
from the view that the exception effectuates the Establishment Clause
principle that civil government lacks competence to resolve
ecclesiastical questions.
2. Characterizing the Ministerial Exception
Whereas the Court in Hosanna-Tabor dedicated significant
attention to the arguments in favor of recognition of a ministerial
exception, it addressed the procedural issues implicated by the
exception briefly and only in a footnote. Acknowledging the divide
among the lower courts, the Supreme Court announced that the
exception does not function as a jurisdictional bar. Instead, the Court
concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense. The
Court explained that “the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether
the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether
the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’” 103 The Court added that
federal district courts “have power to consider ADA claims in cases of
this sort, and to decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead
barred by the ministerial exception.” 104 Although the footnote is quite
significant, it is remarkably terse, given the potentially significant
consequences of the conclusion that the exception operates as an
affirmative defense.

102 See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (“[A]ppellant argues that the first amendment
cannot bar his action for breach of an oral employment contract. We find this
contention compelling…. A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily
through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”) (citing
Jones v. Wolf, 419 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)); see also Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and
Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54.
103 Id. at 194 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
254 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104 565 U.S. at 194 n.4.
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Some commentators have read the Hosanna-Tabor footnote
implicitly to reinforce a broad doctrine of church autonomy, 105 which
they find embodied elsewhere in the opinion. For example, Michael
Helfand has argued that “the Supreme Court’s decision in HosannaTabor lays the groundwork for reconceptualizing church autonomy as a
constitutionalized version of arbitration.” 106 As we discuss in greater
detail below, defendants ordinarily waive affirmative defenses by
failing (or choosing not) to raise them. 107 Helfand relies on this
characteristic of affirmative defenses to argue that they confirm and
enhance the autonomy of religious institutions. On this view, the
religious organization’s choice to waive the ministerial exception (by
declining to raise it) amounts to consent to a secular court’s binding
resolution of a dispute with a ministerial employee. 108
Helfand understands the church property cases that we
described above to mean that the members and employees of religious
organizations impliedly consent to church adjudication of their
disputes. 109 Helfand does not read those cases to stand for a principle
of limited competence of secular courts to decide such disputes. 110
Instead, in his view, they reflect a judgment that disputes between
religious organizations and their members or employees will be
resolved by secular courts only if the religious organization elects that
forum for adjudication. 111 He uses Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four to
ground this understanding of church autonomy:
“[O]nce we unmoor church autonomy from judicial incompetence
and instead hitch church autonomy to the consent of the parties,
Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four comes into focus. If religious
institutional authority is grounded in an implied agreement
between the institution and its members, then surely those

For an example of an article that advances a broad view of church autonomy, see
Christopher Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of HosannaTabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2013).
106 Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1901 (2013).
107 See infra at notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
108 Helfand, supra note 106, at 1921-23.
109 Id. at 1921.
110 Id. at 1902 (“[T]he deference and authority granted arbitrators has nothing to do
with the incompetence of courts or an attempt to emphasize the limited nature of
state power; arbitrators have authority because parties jointly choose to place their
disputes within the jurisdiction of an alternative forum for resolution.”).
111 Id. at 1923-24.
105
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very same parties can employ that same consent mechanism to
authorize courts to resolve intractable religious disputes.” 112
In Helfand’s view, the choice whether to raise the ministerial exception
both reflects and reinforces the religious institution’s autonomy.
As explained above, we disagree with the suggestion that the
ministerial exception is primarily rooted in a doctrine of church
autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause. 113 In part, this is because
we thoroughly disagree with his interpretation of the church property
and personnel cases that the Court relied on in Hosanna-Tabor. In
none of those decisions did the Court suggest that religious
communities could confer authority or competence on secular courts to
decide purely ecclesiastical questions. Indeed, as we explained above,
those cases stand for precisely the opposite proposition. Secular courts
lack authority to decide religious questions regardless of whether the
parties to the disputes raising those questions want courts to resolve
them. 114
In addition, we think that Helfand’s argument ultimately leads
to constitutional difficulties in the procedures for adjudicating cases
involving the ministerial exception. On Helfand’s view, a religious
institution can waive the exception and voluntarily submit a religious
dispute to the civil courts. As we explain below, the underlying
justification for the ministerial exception is simply inconsistent with
this view. 115
It is not surprising that the Hosanna-Tabor footnote has
prompted such arguments. The Court’s analysis of the proper
procedure for resolving assertions of the ministerial exception was not
only brief but also circular. The Court’s justification for treating the
exception as an affirmative defense instead of a jurisdictional bar was
that the exception did not raise a question of the court’s “power to hear
the case.” 116 But this simply states the conclusion. After all, when we
say that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a particular
case, what we mean is that the court lacks power to hear it.
Despite its circularity, we agree with the Court’s ultimate
conclusion that the ministerial exception operates as an affirmative
defense rather than as a jurisdictional bar. First, as a straightforward
matter of civil procedure, federal courts have subject matter
Id. at 1923.
See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle,
Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1296-1303.
114 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1299-1301.
115 See infra at notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
116 565 U.S. at 194 n.4.
112
113
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jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. 117 Claims asserted in
federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with Disabilities
Act are claims arising under federal law even when asserted by
employees of religious organizations. To be sure, when the ministerial
exception applies, such claims will ordinarily fail. But the inability of
the plaintiff to recover does not retroactively deprive the court of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.
Second, determining the applicability of the ministerial
exception will usually require the resolution of threshold questions of
fact. As we explain in more detail below, to decide whether the
exception applies, a court must first conclude that the employee in
question is in fact properly deemed a minister. As in Hosanna-Tabor,
this inquiry will often require the resolution of disputed questions of
fact, such as what the employee’s actual responsibilities entail. 118 The
court also has to determine whether the plaintiff’s specific claims are of
the sort that implicate the exception, a decision that also might turn on
facts not apparent on the face of the complaint. 119
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, however, should be
susceptible to resolution at the threshold of a case. This is true both for
formal and prudential reasons. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power
of a court to proceed. If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it
should not entertain the case. In addition, it wastes judicial resources
for courts to defer resolution of the question of their subject matter
jurisdiction until after the parties have spent time on discovery and
other pre-trial matters. In other words, a court should be able to decide
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in
the complaint. To be sure, there are times when a court has to resolve
disputed questions of fact in order to decide whether it has subject
117 The Court in Hosanna-Tabor appears to have been concerned with suits filed in
federal court rather than in state court. After all, the Supreme Court does not
determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts. As such, there is
nothing to stop a state, either by legislative action or judicial decision, from
concluding that its courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases implicating the
ministerial exception. But states lack authority to depart from Hosanna-Tabor in the
opposite direction. Because the ministerial exception implements the Religion
Clauses of the federal Constitution, state courts cannot decide cases in which the
exception applies.
118 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-94 (discussing whether Cheryl Perich was
properly considered a minister, in light of her responsibilities).
119 A breach-of-contract claim by a minister against her employer seeking unpaid
wages, for example, is not barred by the exception. See supra at notes 101-102 and
accompanying text.
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matter jurisdiction, such as when, in a suit not arising under federal
law, there is a conflict over where a party is domiciled. 120 But cases
involving the ministerial exception will virtually always raise
questions of fact.
For these reasons, we agree with the Court that the ministerial
exception operates as an affirmative defense. Our agreement largely
reflects the technical understanding of “jurisdictional” in matters of
civil procedure. This conclusion, however, does not contradict the
entire body of scholarly work that has characterized the relationship
between
civil
government
and
religious
institutions
as
121
“jurisdictional.”
The central premise of that work reflects the
fundamental claim that institutions of civil government—because of
their secular character—lack competence to decide religious questions.
A matter can be conceptually jurisdictional, in the sense of competence,
without it necessarily depriving the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it does not follow from Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote
four that courts should treat the ministerial exception the same way
that they treat other, conventional affirmative defenses. As the Court
explained in Hosanna-Tabor, the exception applies as a matter of
constitutional imperative, not simply as a prudential matter. Put more
starkly, the Hosanna-Tabor footnote must be read in light of the
fundamental justification for the ministerial exception. And that
exception, as we have argued above, imposes a disability on civil
government with respect to specific religious questions. Thus, the
affirmative defense must take into account this constitutional
disability.
For this reason, we agree only in part with Professor
Wasserman’s analysis of Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote 4. 122 Wasserman
argues that the Court properly concluded that the ministerial
exception is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar
because the exception reflects Congress’s lack of “prescriptive

120 See, e.g., Boustead v. Barancid, 151 F.R.D. 102, 105 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (permitting
the plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery “on the jurisdictional issue”); S. I. Strong,
Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
489, 555-57 (2010); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction,
Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exception, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 289, 314 (2012) (discussing “jurisdictional discovery”).
121 See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE 3-39 (2014).
122 Wasserman, supra note 120.
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jurisdiction” 123 over religious questions. 124 When the government lacks
this form of authority, it cannot prescribe any rule to govern the
conduct at issue. But “the nonexistence of a legal rule does not deprive
a court of judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under appropriate
law.” 125 Instead, in Wasserman’s view, a “claim of right fails because
there is no legal rule … to be enforced, which results in the failure on
the merits of any claim brought under that purported rule.” 126
In other words, Wasserman argues that the ministerial
exception exists because Congress lacks power to regulate certain
church affairs. In his view, however, courts do not lack “adjudicative
jurisdiction” 127 over such matters. 128 Instead, courts must rule against
the plaintiff in cases in which the exception applies because Congress
lacked power to impose a duty on the church in the first place. This is
simply another way of saying that courts do not lack subject matter
jurisdiction to decide cases implicating the ministerial exception. On
this view, the problem “is not that courts are barred from evaluating a
priest’s job performance or from ordering his reinstatement; it is that
secular lawmaking institutions are barred from enacting rules that
provide a legal basis for evaluation and reinstatement.” 129
As noted above, we agree with Wasserman that the ministerial
exception does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
over cases implicating the exception. But we disagree with his further
Id. at 298 (“Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to
prescribe legal rules and to regulate real-world behavior.”).
124 Id. at 300-301 (“The ministerial exemption limits the right/duty combinations that
Congress can create between religious organizations and their ministerial employees,
as well as the conduct that Congress, exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction, can
prohibit in that relationship. In other words, it is accurate to say that the First
Amendment erects a ‘jurisdictional bar,’ so long as we understand that the
jurisdiction barred is Congress’s prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction to enact legal
rules regulating some real-world conduct.”).
125 Id. at 299.
126 Id. at 299-300.
127 Id. at 302 (“[A]djudicative jurisdiction … is a court’s root power to adjudicate—to
hear and resolve legal and factual issues under substantive legal rules, and to
provide the adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of right. Adjudicative
jurisdiction has nothing to do with the ultimate success of a claim on its merits, but
rather focuses solely on whether the court has the power to provide a forum for
considering and resolving the legal and factual disputes under those rules in either
direction.”).
128 Id. at 303 (“The ministerial exemption is indeed a constitutional bar on civil
jurisdiction. But the bar is not on the court's civil jurisdiction to decide the case
before it, but on Congress’s civil jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating churches’
conduct toward ministerial employees.”).
129 Id. at 304.
123
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suggestion that any disability the courts face in resolving such
questions is solely the consequence of Congress’s lack of authority to
prescribe the governing rule. 130 In our view, courts face a limitation—
what Wasserman calls an “adjudicative disability” 131 —for the same
reason that Congress lacks the power to prescribe a substantive rule:
civil government is simply not competent to adjudicate strictly and
purely ecclesiastical questions. 132 When courts seek to resolve such
matters, they impermissibly inject civil government into church
affairs. 133
To take an example drawn from a slightly different context, a
state legislature has prescriptive authority to regulate property, and
even to regulate church ownership of property. But courts nevertheless
lack authority to resolve certain types of disputes that can arise over
the ownership of that property, such as when competing claims to the
property can be decided only by resolving a disputed question of church
doctrine.
Indeed, the Kedroff case, on which the Court relied in HosannaTabor, was in fact the culmination of an ongoing dispute over how to
resolve a question about church property. In 1945, the New York
legislature enacted a law providing “both for the incorporation and
administration of Russian Orthodox churches.” 134 The purpose of the
law was to make all Russian Orthodox churches in New York
autonomous from the Patriarch of Moscow. 135 “This declared autonomy
was made effective by a further legislative requirement that all the
130 Id. at 304 (“[T]he limitation on judicial decisionmaking [when the ministerial
exception applies] is incidental to the broader limitation on legislative power and on
the reach and scope of the substantive law Congress can enact…. [T]he judicial
limitation arises not from an absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence
of existing legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an
absence of prescriptive authority to enact those rules.”).
131 Id. at 303-04.
132 See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 121, at 54-61; see also Helfand, supra note 106, at
1897-98 n.34.
133 Wasserman concedes that “[t]he First Amendment disables all secular law and all
secular institutions from regulating the church’s actions on matters of faith,
structure, and membership, placing these matters entirely beyond the authority of
the state.” Id. at 304. But he argues that the “judiciary is implicated only because
that is the forum in which secular legal rules are enforced.” Id. In his view, “the
problem … is not that courts are barred from evaluating a priest’s job performance or
from ordering his reinstatement,” but rather “it is that secular lawmaking
institutions are barred from enacting rules that provide a legal basis for evaluation
or reinstatement.” Id.
134 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97.
135 Id. at 98.

26

churches formerly administratively subject to the Moscow synod and
patriarchate should for the future be governed by the ecclesiastical
body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan district.” 136 The
Court invalidated this law in Kedroff, reasoning that a “a transfer by
statute of control over churches” was inconsistent with both the
“separation of church and state” and the Free Exercise Clause. 137 On
remand from the Supreme Court’s decision, the New York Court of
Appeals ordered a retrial on an issue the New York court believed was
left open. 138 Relying on a state common-law rule, the court held that
control of church property and authority to appoint the church
leadership was contingent on the legitimacy of those who claim to
exercise that power. 139 In the case of the Russian Orthodox Church,
the court determined that control by Soviet authorities in Moscow
deprived the Patriarch of Moscow of the deference ordinarily due to
church hierarchy. 140 Instead, the court concluded that the powers at
issue must be vested in the local members of the denomination. 141
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam
decision. In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 142 the Court explained
that the New York decision rested “on the same premises which were
found to have underlain the enactment of the statute struck down” in
Kedroff. 143 The Court declared that it was of no moment “that the State
has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether
legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we
are asked to scrutinize.” 144 Kreshik stands for the proposition that
neither legislatures nor courts have authority to resolve strictly and

Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 110, 121.
138 St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America v.
Kedroff, 306 N.Y. 38, 55, 114 N.E.2d 197, 207 (1953).
139 114 N.E.2d at 204 (“[T]here is one basic qualification to [the application of the rule
of Watson v. Jones]. That is that the highest church authority or tribunal, whose
decision is to be accorded final and conclusive effect, must in truth and fact be
capable of functioning freely with its activities directed by churchmen in the interests
of the church and in accordance with the organic law of the church.”).
140 Id. at 205 (“Uncritical acceptance of the principle of Watson v. Jones [would
require] the communicants of the metropolitan district to acknowledge the
administrative rule of persons whom they believe are mere puppets of a monolithic
and atheistic secular power, if such communicants wish to continue to use the
religious temporalities they have so long enjoyed.”).
141 Id.
142 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
143 Id. at 190.
144 Id. (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
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purely ecclesiastical questions. As a consequence, courts face an
adjudicative disability when confronted with these sorts of questions.
The ministerial exception must be understood in light of these
principles. Although it is an affirmative defense, the underlying
justification for the exception requires courts to treat it differently
from ordinary affirmative defenses. In a typical case, after a defendant
raises its affirmative defenses in the answer, the parties begin
discovery. Normally, the parties can seek discovery of any information
that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any party; 145 discovery is
rarely limited to material relevant solely to a particular affirmative
defense. After the parties complete discovery, it is common for one or
both of the parties to move for summary judgment. If the court denies
a motion for summary judgment, the decision ordinarily is not subject
to immediate appeal; 146 instead, the matter proceeds to trial, which
(depending on the claims) might involve a jury as fact-finder.
The Court’s characterization of the ministerial exception as an
affirmative defense, however, does not require lower courts to follow
these ordinary procedures in cases involving the exception. Instead,
fidelity to the constitutional norms reflected in Hosanna-Tabor
requires courts to recognize the distinctive status of this particular
defense. As we explain below, Establishment Clause limitations on the
authority of courts to resolve religious questions requires courts to
treat the ministerial exception quite differently from ordinary
affirmative defenses.
The Court has followed a similar approach with qualified
immunity. 147 Government officials enjoy a qualified immunity from
suit for their official conduct, provided that their conduct did not
violate clearly established law. 148 The Court has described the defense

145 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense ….”); Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
26(d)(3)(B) (“Unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise for the parties’
and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice … discovery by one party
does not require any other party to delay its discovery.”).
146 See 28 U.S.C. 1291 (“The courts of appeals … shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ….”).
147 See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th
Cir.2002) (comparing ministerial exception to qualified immunity).
148 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known”).
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as “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” 149
that courts should seek to resolve “at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” 150 The Court nevertheless has held that qualified immunity
is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the government
official, rather than a jurisdictional bar. 151 Because of the distinctive
character of the defense, however, the Court has made clear that the
ordinary rules governing the assertion and adjudication of affirmative
defenses do not always apply to qualified immunity. For example,
although a government official can waive the defense by failing to raise
it, courts often allow defendants to raise the defense at stages of the
litigation later than an ordinary affirmative defense must be
asserted. 152 In addition, denials of motions for summary judgment by
government officials on grounds of qualified immunity are immediately
appealable, notwithstanding the ordinary rule against interlocutory
appeals. 153
The Court has made clear that these special rules apply because
of the underlying justification for the defense, which is to ensure that
government officials are not unduly inhibited in carrying out their
duties by fear of civil liability. 154 In this respect, it closely resembles
the ministerial exception. Both are affirmative defenses in the formal
sense, yet they owe their existence to more fundamental legal
principles
that
themselves
reflect
limits—prudential
or
constitutional—on the power of courts.
III. THE PROCEDURE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
In our view, courts should be similarly sensitive in overseeing
litigation that potentially involves the ministerial exception. Because
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); accord Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
151 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never indicated that
qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action;
instead we have described it as a defense available to the official in question. Since
qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.”)
(internal citations omitted).
152 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913-14 (7th Cir.
2011); Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993); Quezada v. County
of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 1991).
153 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299
(1996).
154 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (explaining that qualified
immunity protects against “the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of
trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of
discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service”).
149
150
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the Court in Hosanna-Tabor gave only cursory treatment of the
procedural issues raised by the exception, lower courts lack guidance
about how to proceed. In particular, the Court failed to address the
questions most likely to arise in suits implicating the ministerial
exception. First, should the religious organization assert the exception
by way of a motion to dismiss, or may it only raise the defense in its
answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for
summary judgment? Second, if the matter is not properly resolved at
the motion to dismiss stage, should the court limit the scope and order
of discovery in order to resolve the application of the exception prior to
discovery on other issues in the suit? Third, if the court denies a
church’s motion based on the exception, can the church take an
immediate appeal? Fourth, if disputed questions of fact concerning the
plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be resolved at the summary
judgment stage, can those questions be submitted to and resolved by a
jury? Fifth, if the defendant fails to raise the defense, may or should
the court raise the ministerial sua sponte, or should the court instead
treat the defense as waived? We address these questions in turn.
A. Raising the Defense
First, does the religious organization properly assert the
ministerial exception by way of a motion to dismiss, or may it only
raise the defense in its answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way
of a motion for summary judgment? If nothing else, it is clear from
footnote 4 in Hosanna-Tabor that a court should not grant a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based on the ministerial exception. This follows from the Court’s
conclusion that the exception does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. A
court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction simply because the
case involves a claim asserted by a ministerial employee against that
person’s religious employer. Indeed, even in cases in which the court
concludes that the exception is a complete defense against the claim,
the court, as a technical matter, does not lack subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, in such a case, the appropriate disposition is a
judgment on the merits in favor of the religious organization. 155

155 See Wasserman, supra note 120, at 307 (“The point is that no statutory rule exists
as law subjecting the church-operated school for this employment decision affecting
this employee. [A] civil action to enforce such a nonexistent rule fails, a failure on the
merits under any of our definitions.”).
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Ordinarily, affirmative defenses are pleaded in the answer and
then resolved by a motion for summary judgment after discovery. 156
That said, in some rare cases, a court may be able to grant a religious
organization’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because of the application of the
ministerial exception. For example, if the plaintiff sues for age
discrimination and specifically alleges in the complaint that he is a
minister with pastoral responsibilities in the church, a court likely can
grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Even assuming
that all of the plaintiff’s allegations about discrimination are true, the
plaintiff cannot recover because of the ministerial exception. To be
sure, as a technical matter the proper approach might be for the
defendant to file an answer raising the exception and then to move for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), 157 but for present
purposes the point is that the court may resolve such a case at the
threshold without the need for discovery. 158
In the ordinary run of cases, however, the ministerial exception
will be resolved by a motion for summary judgment. The Court in
Hosanna-Tabor made clear that the exception does not apply to all
employees of religious organizations; instead, it applies only in cases in
See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense ….”); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a)
(“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the
part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”).
157 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not
to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”). At least one court
has addressed (but denied) a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the
ministerial exception since Hosanna-Tabor. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., 48 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
158 The ministerial exception is not unique in this regard. Similar questions arise in
cases in which the allegations in the complaint make clear that the statute of
limitations has run. Courts often grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in
such cases, even though, strictly speaking, they probably ought to be resolved by
motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). This is because the statute
of limitations is an affirmative defense that a defendant waives by failing to raise it.
(We address the question of waiver in the context of the ministerial exception infra at
190-209.) As such, the defendant must assert the defense in order to rely on it as a
basis for judgment. Accordingly, courts should grant motions resolving cases on the
ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations only once the defendant has
had an opportunity to assert the defense in the answer. See Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir.2010) (concluding that
a court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by a
statute of limitations only when “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of
the complaint”); Young v. Spokane County, 2014 WL 2893260 (E. Dist. Wash.)
(considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on statute of limitations).
156

31

which the plaintiff is properly considered a minister. 159 In addition,
although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not address the question
whether all claims by ministerial employees are subject to the
exception, many lower courts have held that the exception does not
apply to certain claims by ministerial employees—including some
arising under employment discrimination laws. As noted above, courts
have regularly concluded that they may resolve claims by ministerial
employees of sexual harassment against their religious employers,
notwithstanding the exception. 160 Other types of claims—including
those for breach of contract for unpaid wages—are also outside the
scope of the ministerial exception. 161
As a consequence, any case in which a religious organization
raises the ministerial exception requires a court to resolve at least two
questions: first, is the plaintiff a ministerial employee; and second, is
the plaintiff’s claim one that is within the scope of the exception. The
resolution of these questions almost invariably requires assessment of
the facts at issue in the dispute. To determine whether the plaintiff is
a ministerial employee, the court must consider at last the employee’s
“formal title,” “the substance reflected in that title,” the employee’s
“own use of that title,” and “the important religious functions” that the
employee performed for the religious organization. 162 The parties in
these controversies, as in Hosanna-Tabor itself, often offer conflicting
evidence about these matters.
Similarly, whether the plaintiff’s claim is the type to which the
ministerial exception applies will sometimes require the resolution of
disputed factual questions. For example, imagine that the plaintiff
enters a two-year contract to perform ministerial services for a
religious organization. After the organization fires him within that
two-year period, he files suit for breach of contract. The religious
organization defends by relying on a clause in the contract that
allowed termination for “good cause.” On a motion for summary
judgment, the court must resolve whether the good cause defense in
this case implicates an ecclesiastical question. If the defendant claims
that good cause existed because the plaintiff’s sermons deviated from
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (“Having concluded that there is a ministerial
exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider
whether the exception applies in this case.”); id. at 191-95 (determining whether the
plaintiff, an employee of a religious organization, was properly considered a
minister).
160 See supra at notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
161 See supra at notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
162 565 U.S. at 192.
159
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church doctrine, the ministerial exception will apply; if the defendant
claims that good cause existed for other reasons, the exception might
not apply.
The Court in Hosanna- Tabor made clear, at a minimum, that
courts must resolve the threshold question whether the plaintiff is a
minister. The Court rejected Justice Thomas’s view, which he
expressed in a concurring opinion, that courts must accept, without
further inquiry, a sincere assertion of the defense by a religious
organization. 163 Accordingly, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor recognized
that cases implicating the ministerial exception will often involve
disputed questions of fact. 164 As a consequence, a motion for summary
judgment will ordinarily be the appropriate mechanism for resolving
an assertion of the ministerial exception.
There are two ways that the defendant might present a motion
for summary judgment based on the exception. First, a religious
organization might file a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and support the motion by appending additional
materials to demonstrate the application of the exception. In such
cases, the court should convert the motion to a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 12(d). 165 Second, the parties might conduct
discovery, and the defendant then files motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56(a). After Hosanna-Tabor, because the application of the
exception is not a jurisdictional bar, summary judgment will almost
invariably be the appropriate mechanism for deciding whether the
exception applies.
163 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the
Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to
a religious organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”).
164 Because the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor asserted the type of claim that plainly is
covered by the exception, the Court had no occasion to address the application of the
ministerial exception to other types of claims, such as breach of contract. See
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“The case before us is an employment
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision
to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We
express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions
by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers.”). As noted above, however, resolving this question of scope will often
require courts to decide factual disputes.
165 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion.”). Some courts have taken this approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F.Supp.2d 701, 711 (D.MD 2013).
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B. The Scope of Discovery
This conclusion raises our second question. If a case implicating
the ministerial exception is not resolved by a motion to dismiss, should
courts limit the scope and order of discovery to the application of the
exception before permitting discovery on other issues in the suit?
Ordinarily, once discovery begins, the parties presumptively are free to
conduct discovery on anything within the scope of discovery—that is,
any matter that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” 166 In
cases involving the ministerial exception, however, courts should
invoke their discretion to manage the proceedings to limit discovery to
the matters relevant to the application of the exception. 167
Those who defend the ministerial exception often argue for quick
resolution of the issue in order to avoid burdening religious
organizations with the cost of discovery. They note that the practical
implications for a religious organization of having to litigate a
ministerial exception claim all the way through full discovery are
significant. Not only must churches bear the ordinary costs of
defending the suit, but in ordinary discovery their leaders can be
examined on questions of church doctrine and their congregations’
consistency with church doctrine, and countless other matters that
might chill a religious institution’s articulation of its own faith if it
knows that it might face discovery. 168
We do not find this justification for narrowing the scope of
discovery, standing alone, to be particularly persuasive. To be sure,
discovery can be costly, intrusive, and time consuming; but this is true
for all defendants in civil litigation who seek to resolve the suit on the
basis of some threshold defense. Instead, any argument in favor of

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b). This is confirmed by Rule 16, which states that the court
ay issue a scheduling order to “modify the extent of discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
16(b)(3)(B)(ii). Absent such an order, the parties presumptively may seek discovery
on any relevant issue in the suit.
167 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). Matters relevant to the application of the
ministerial exception include both information about whether the plaintiff is a
ministerial employee and information about whether the claim is the type subject to
the exception.
168 See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining
the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 298 n.
330 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s decision to treat the ministerial exception as an
affirmative defense still leaves defendants at a risk of the increased time and
expense associated with summary judgment.”).
166
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limiting preliminary discovery to matters relevant to one particular
defense must arise out of the ultimate justification for that defense.
Other defenders of the ministerial exception have argued that
courts should limit discovery to the application of the exception
because any broader discovery threatens the principle of church
autonomy. 169 This argument relies primarily on the Free Exercise
Clause and specifically on the claim that the Clause insulates religious
organizations from government interference in their internal decisionmaking. 170 But this argument proves too much. Not every “internal”
decision made by a religious institution is protected from scrutiny by
courts or other organs of civil government. For example, a court may
intervene if a congregation decides not to pay a minister after the
minister has performed her required duties under a contract with the
church. 171
As we explained above, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor ultimately
recognized a ministerial exception because of Establishment Clause
concerns about the impropriety of civil government intruding into or
resolving questions about the fitness of a person for employment as a
minister. 172 If courts do not impose limits on the scope of discovery in a
suit in which the defendant religious organization has asserted the
ministerial exception, then the plaintiff will be free to seek discovery of
information that proves her fitness for the position. For example, a
plaintiff unconstrained by an order narrowing the scope of discovery
might seek to depose congregants about the quality of her sermons, or
the orthodoxy of her teaching. But the mere discovery of such
information could well provoke disputes or discord within the
congregation, and the “facts” discovered are certainly ones that no
court could properly find. In other words, the disruption of life within
See, e.g., Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 235
(“This article advocates that the application of the ministerial exception as a
threshold legal determination is necessary to preserve foundational religious rights
….”); id. at 293 (“[D]iscovery should be directed towards answering questions that
would highlight the clash of principles present in these cases, and should not
encompass the entire merits of the claim or all of the other various issues that might
be implicated in the case. Discovery, like other litigation expenses, compounds the
injury that attends the invasion of this constitutionally protected turf.”).
170 See id. at 250-69; Kalscheur, supra note 39, at 55-63; Lund, supra note 105, at
1196-1201.
171 See, e.g., Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, D.C. App. Lexis 656 (2002) (applying
ministerial exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by ordained
minister who was terminated by the congregation); Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy,
and Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54.
172 See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text.
169
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the religious community would promote no legitimate governmental
interests.
To be sure, if the court concludes that the ministerial exception
does not apply—either because the plaintiff is not a minister within
the meaning of the exception or because the claim is not one to which
the exception applies—then it may permit discovery on other issues
implicated by the claims in the suit. At that point, the religious
organization cannot simply rely on a claim of autonomy or the need to
avoid internal discord as a way of resisting discovery. But courts
should not unnecessarily authorize discovery that might turn out to be
moot because of the application of the ministerial exception.
Accordingly, if a religious organization is a defendant and raises
the ministerial exception in a motion for summary judgment, trial
courts should exercise their discretion to “modify the extent of
discovery” by initially limiting discovery only to facts relevant to the
ministerial exception. 173 This approach is typical in cases involving
qualified immunity, 174 which (we noted above) is an atypical
affirmative defense similar in many ways to the ministerial exception.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). At least three federal district courts have taken
this approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
N.Y., 175 F.Supp.3d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“In a bench ruling, I found that I could
not determine whether the ministerial exception applied at the motion to dismiss
stage because of the necessarily fact-intensive inquiry that exception necessitates,
and because Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that she was not a minister, and had no
religious training, duties or functions; that others handled all religiously related
activities; and that she was simply a secular administrator doing what a publicschool principal would do. I therefore directed the parties to engage in limited
discovery on the issue.”); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F.Supp.2d 668,
670 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“The Court allowed limited discovery to determine whether the
ministerial exception applies.”); Collette v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2016 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 99886, at *10 (N.D.Ill.) (“To help focus the discovery to be taken in this phase,
the Court notes that the scope of the issue subject to discovery is narrow. As there is
no dispute that Defendants are religious institutions, the only remaining question is
whether Collette's employment with them was ministerial.”).
174 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599-600 (1998) (Of course, the judge should
give priority to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified immunity
defense, such as the actions that the official actually took, since that defense should
be resolved as early as possible.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6
(1987) (“[Q]ualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible
stage of a litigation. [If the defendant] claims he took are different from those the
[plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed
lawful), then discovery may be necessary before [the defendant’s] motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any
such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of [the defendant’s]
qualified immunity.”).
173
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C. Interlocutory Appeals
Another question likely to arise in this sort of litigation is
whether a religious organization can take an immediate appeal from a
court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the
ministerial exception. The ordinary rule in federal court is that denials
of motions for summary judgment are not subject to interlocutory
appeal; instead, parties must wait for a final judgment before filing a
notice of appeal. 175 (The rules governing interlocutory appeals vary
from state to state, with some jurisdictions following the federal
approach and others authorizing immediate appeals for certain types
of issues or trial court decisions. 176)
There are several exceptions to the final judgment rule in
federal court, but the Supreme Court has construed them very
narrowly. 177 The exception most likely to apply to the denial of motions
for summary judgment in disputes over ministerial employment is the
collateral order doctrine. 178 Under that doctrine, appeal before a final
judgment is available for “district court decisions that are conclusive,
that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits,
and that would render such important questions effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying
action.” 179
The mere fact that a trial court order resolves a matter that is
jurisdictional in character is not sufficient to warrant immediate
appeal under the doctrine. For example, district court decisions
denying motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction do not fall
within the scope of the collateral order doctrine. 180 Nor does the fact
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 (permitting interlocutory appeals as of right for some
non-final orders), with N.J. Rule 2:5-6 (interlocutory appeals only on application to
the court of appeals, and granted only in court of appeals’ discretion).
177 See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
178 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
179 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).
180 Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501 (1989) (holding that a claimed
right to be sued in a particular forum based on a forum-selection clause is “surely as
effectively vindicable as a claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant—and hence does not fall within the third prong of the collateral order
doctrine”); Turi v. Main Street Adoption Serv., LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“A claim that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant can be
vindicated on appeal after trial, and thus does not satisfy the third prong of the
collateral-order doctrine.”).
175
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that an order requires the disclosure of especially sensitive information
render it amenable to immediate appeal. The most prominent example
of this is the Court’s conclusion that orders rejecting claims of
attorney-client privilege are not immediately appealable collateral
orders. 181 The Court’s reasoning in concluding that such orders are not
subject to immediate appeal almost certainly applies to orders
rejecting claims of priest-penitent privilege, as well. 182
At first blush, denials of motions for summary judgment based
on the ministerial exception seem like poor candidates for immediate
appeal. First, the Court expressly concluded in Hosanna-Tabor that
the doctrine does not serve as a jurisdictional bar, and not even
determinations adverse to jurisdictional defenses ordinarily are
immediately appealable. Second, the mere fact that litigation of claims
in such suits might implicate sensitive church matters alone is not
sufficient to qualify. 183
181 See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (holding that
“disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” do not “qualify for
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine”).
182 The Court acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege serves “broader public
interests,” id. at 108, but it explained that courts “routinely require litigants to wait
until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our
adversarial system,” id. at 109. The Court reasoned that “postjudgment appeals
generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the
attorney-client privilege” because “appellate courts can remedy the improper
disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other
erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a
new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.”
Id. at 109. The Court also recognized that “an order to disclose privileged information
intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications,” but it asserted
that “deferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante
incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.” Id. Finally,
the Court explained that “established mechanisms for appellate review”—such as
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or defying a discovery order and
appealing a contempt determination—“not only provide assurances to clients and
counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they also go a long
way toward addressing [the] concern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse
attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship.” Id.
at 112. Even though “an order to disclose privileged material may, in some
situations, have implications beyond the case at hand,” “the same can be said about
many categories of pretrial discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are
unavailable.” Id.
183 At least one federal court of appeals has taken this approach since HosannaTabor. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1090 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional rights asserted in defense of
this suit are undoubtedly important, the Diocese has not established that the Title
VII exemptions or the First Amendment more generally provides an immunity from
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To be sure, religious organizations have contended that denials
of motions based on the ministerial exception should be immediately
appealable because of the force of the Free Exercise Clause.
Proponents of this view have argued that, in cases in which the trial
court errs in rejecting the ministerial exception, forcing the church to
litigate impermissibly intrudes on church autonomy, by exposing
internal church decision-making to public scrutiny. 184 But such
claims, like claims about the sensitivity of attorney-client
communications, are likely insufficient for immediate appeal.
A stronger argument for immediate appeal of denials of motions
for summary judgment based on the ministerial exception can be
grounded in an analogy to the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for acts
within the scope of their employment, if those acts were not
inconsistent with clearly established law at the time of the violation.
The Court has held that denials of motions for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. 185 The Court has reasoned that qualified
immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Accordingly, a decision denying
qualified immunity is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” 186
As we explained above, although the Court concluded in
Hosanna-Tabor that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense
rather than a jurisdictional bar, it nevertheless made clear that the
exception is best understood as an effectuation of the Establishment
Clause’s limits on governmental authority to decide strictly and purely
ecclesiastical matters. On this view, civil courts lack competence to
resolve questions about a person’s fitness to serve as a ministerial
trial, as opposed to an ordinary defense to liability.”). As explained below, we think
this approach is mistaken. But see McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2013)
(permitting interlocutory appeal to prevent adjudication of nun’s standing within the
church).
184 See Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 295 (“[T]he
judicial process employed to resolve this threshold legal question should focus on: (1)
producing a narrow decision as to whether the ministerial exception applies or not,
and (2) allowing a prompt appeal of a negative decision so as not to force the religious
body through years of expensive litigation, simultaneously wearing down its
resources and its will to stand on principle.”).
185 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); supra notes 147-154 and
accompanying text.
186 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27.
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employee. So understood, the exception is an affirmative defense only
because not all assertions by churches that the plaintiff is a ministerial
employee must be accepted by a court, and because courts can
entertain some of types claims asserted by ministers against their
religious employers. But the practical necessity of resolving these
factual predicates does not change the exception’s essential character
as an Establishment Clause limitation on the competence of
governmental bodies to resolve certain religious questions.
As such, the ministerial exception closely resembles qualified
immunity for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. If a trial court
denies a motion for summary judgment invoking the ministerial
exception, but the trial court turns out to have erred in that conclusion,
the absence of an avenue for immediate appeal will require the court
not only to permit discovery about, but to resolve, quintessentially
religious questions. But the Establishment Clause limits the power of
the government not only to issue and enforce a binding judgment on
such matters, but also merely to entertain such questions.
Unlike qualified immunity, however, the fundamental value of
the ministerial exception would not be entirely lost by waiting for a
final judgment before permitting an appeal. An appellate court can
reverse a judgment that is inconsistent with a proper understanding of
the ministerial exception, and thus relieve the religious organization of
improperly assigned liability. In this sense, a decision denying
summary judgment based on the ministerial exception is not
effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. That is, the ministerial
exception, at bottom, is still a “defense to liability,” rather than a
comprehensive immunity from suit. But nonetheless, application of the
collateral order doctrine in this context would better guard against
Establishment Clause violations by trials courts than would the
standard requirement of a final judgment before appeal.
D. The Appropriate Finder of Disputed Facts
Although it is unusual, sometimes disputed questions of fact
concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be resolved at the
summary judgment stage. For example, imagine that the plaintiff, who
was a church organist, sues the church alleging that he was fired
because of his age and replaced with a younger musician. 187 The
church raises the ministerial exception and offers deposition testimony
187 Cf. Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 399 Md. 637, 925 A.2d 659 (2007)
(holding that ministerial exception did not apply to church organist).
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stating that the plaintiff often selected music that was used during
worship. The plaintiff responds with evidence that the pastor always
selected the hymns and other liturgical music, and that the plaintiff’s
responsibilities were limited to simply performing the music selected
for him. In light of the other undisputed evidence about the plaintiff’s
responsibilities, the ministerial exception would apply only if the
plaintiff had a role in selecting hymns, and therefore in planning or
leading worship. If there is a genuine dispute about this material fact,
a court cannot resolve the church’s motion for summary judgment
based on the ministerial exception.
This does not mean, however, that the exception cannot apply; it
simply means that the facts necessary to determining its application
are in dispute. Ordinarily, when a court denies a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the facts remain in dispute, the matter
proceeds to trial. The same is true in cases implicating the ministerial
exception.
There is little doubt that juries are competent to resolve
disputed facts in employment discrimination cases. The question
remains, however, whether a jury is competent to resolve the disputed
facts necessary to establish whether the plaintiff is a ministerial
employee. We do not believe that there is a clear or categorical answer
to this question. Given the conventional role of juries in resolving
disputed factual matters, 188 courts should prevent juries from resolving
factual predicates to the ministerial exception only on a showing that
jury participation would be inconsistent with the underlying
justification for the exception. We do not perceive any reason why this
should be categorically true. Instead, withdrawal of the question from
a jury should occur only in extraordinary circumstances. For example,
if the defendant is a house of worship of a minority faith in the
surrounding community, it is possible that jury bias will affect the
jury’s resolution of the disputed factual questions. 189 In addition,
courts can use carefully constructed jury instructions or special verdict
Of course, there will be a jury trial only in those cases in which at least one of the
parties has demanded a jury. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 38(b) (“On any issue triable of
right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by … serving the other parties with
a written demand—which may be included in a pleading—no later than 14 days after
the last pleading directed to the issue is served ….”). In employment discrimination
cases, however, plaintiffs often request a jury because of a widely shared perception
that juries are more favorable to individual litigants suing institutional defendants.
189 Cf. Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 248
(arguing that a juror’s “preconceived notions of religion and religious issues may
obscure the resolution of a case.”).
188
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forms to alleviate any lingering concerns about jury competence to
resolve such questions.
E. Waivability
The final procedural issue that could arise in litigation between
a religious institution and its employee is whether the ministerial
exception is waivable. If the defendant fails to raise the defense, either
in the answer or later in the proceeding, may or should the court raise
the ministerial exception sua sponte, or should the court instead treat
the defense as waived? The ordinary rule is that a defendant waives an
affirmative defense if it fails to raise it at a sufficiently early point in
the litigation. 190 In our adversarial system, it typically is not the role
or province of the court to raise defenses or arguments on behalf of the
parties.
There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, a party
who fails to object to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction at the
threshold of the suit does not waive it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(3) specifically provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” 191 But subject matter jurisdiction is unusual in this respect.
Most defenses are waived by the failure to raise them at the earliest
possible opportunity. Threshold defenses, such as lack of personal
jurisdiction or improper venue, must be asserted in a pre-answer
motion to dismiss or in the answer, with minimal opportunity for
amendment. 192 Other affirmative defenses must be raised in the
answer, and although courts are more generous in permitting

190 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively
state any avoidance or affirmative defense ….”); Dole v. Williams Enterprises, Inc.,
876 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“A party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense ...
generally results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case.”
(internal quotations omitted)); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a statutory limit on damages was “an affirmative defense
which must be pleaded timely and that in the cases at bar the defense has been
waived”).
191 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3).
192 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(1) (“A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)(5) by: (A) omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2);
or (B) failing to either: (i) make it by motion under this rule; or (ii) include it in a
responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of
course.”).
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amendment at later stages of the proceeding, 193 they ordinarily will not
raise them sua sponte. 194
Given this set of background rules, there is a strong argument
that courts should raise sua sponte only those defenses that are similar
in character to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant’s
failure to raise all other defenses, on this view, should result in waiver.
As we explained above, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly
concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense,
rather than a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, there is a surface appeal
to the view that a party’s failure to raise the exception should result in
waiver, and a court should not raise it sua sponte.
We believe, however, that the ministerial exception should be
deemed non-waivable, and that courts in fact have an obligation to
raise it sua sponte when a defendant religious organization fails to do
so. Although the exception does not formally operate as a jurisdictional
bar, in the sense that courts do not lack subject matter jurisdiction
over cases implicating the exception, the underlying justification for
the exception weighs strongly in favor of non-waivability.
The ministerial exception is a necessary corollary of the
Establishment Clause principle that prevents courts from resolving
strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions. The exception applies not
just to protect the liberty of religious organizations, but because civil
government lacks competence to resolve religious questions. If a
religious institution waived the ministerial exception by failing to raise
it in a suit in which it applies, the court would be forced to resolve such
questions, in violation of the Establishment Clause. In other words,
government not only lacks prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the
qualifications for ministerial employment, but the courts also face an
adjudicative disability to deciding them. 195

See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that
unpled affirmative defense was not waived when raised at trial at “pragmatically
sufficient time”).
194 See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 116 F.3d 776, 778 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]n
affirmative defense ... generally should not [be] raise[d] sua sponte.”); Eriline Co. S.A.
v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (concluding that, ordinarily, a court
should not raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte). There are exceptions to
this approach. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412-13 (2000) (concluding that
the affirmative defense of res judicata may, in “special circumstances,” be raised sua
sponte); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (holding that court may sua
sponte raise affirmative defense of timeliness of habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A)).
195 Cf. Wasserman, supra note 120, at 303-05.
193
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At least one federal court of appeals has recognized this
implication of Hosanna-Tabor. In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian
Fellowship/USA, 196 a female employee was terminated for violating
her employer’s rule against divorce. The court determined that she was
a ministerial employee—a finding that she did not dispute—but she
argued that the employer had waived the defense. The court
categorically rejected the argument that a religious institution may
waive the ministerial exception where applicable. 197 The court relied
on the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s justification for the existence of the
exception, reasoning that the “constitutional protection is not only a
personal one; it is a structural one that categorically prohibits federal
and state governments from becoming involved in religious leadership
disputes.” 198
As a consequence, courts not only should refuse to deem the
ministerial exception waived by a party’s failure to raise it or by
estoppel, but also should raise it sua sponte in cases in which the facts
disclose that it clearly applies. Consider the facts of EEOC v. Catholic
University of America. 199 The dispute involved the denial of tenure to a
professor in the Canon Law Department at the university. The
professor sued, asserting gender discrimination in the tenure denial. 200
The university argued that the professor’s canon law scholarship failed
to meet the required standards of quality for tenure. For unknown
reasons, the university did not raise the ministerial exception, even
though litigation of her claim necessarily involved the question
whether her scholarship reflected an orthodox understanding of church
teaching. Indeed, the parties conducted extensive discovery, including
777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015). Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the Seventh Circuit reached
the same conclusion. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042
(7th Cir.2006) (“The ministerial exception ... is not subject to waiver or estoppel.”),
abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna–Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. See also Carl H.
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Constraint: Validations and
Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 454-55 (2002) (arguing that a consequence of
treating the Establishment Clause as a structural provision is that its limitations
“cannot be waived” the way that personal rights can be waived).
197 Id. at 836 (“The ministerial exception is a structural limitation imposed on the
government by the Religion Clauses, a limitation that can never be waived.”).
198 Id. The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, has held post-Hosanna-Tabor that a
religious organization may waive the defense on appeal by failing to raise it in its
brief. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2012). The court failed to consider the particular character of the ministerial
exception in reaching this conclusion. For the reasons explained above, we think that
this is incorrect.
199 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
200 Id. at 457-59.
196
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about the substance of her scholarship, and then litigated the
questions at trial. As the district court explained, “The parties called
eighteen witnesses, fourteen of whom were priests or members of a
religious order, and several were subjected to very vigorous crossexamination.” 201
Immediately after the trial but before judgment, Judge
Oberdorfer asked the parties to brief the question whether the
resolution of the dispute would violate the First Amendment. 202 After
briefing, Judge Oberdorfer concluded that the Religion Clauses
precluded him from resolving the core issue in the suit, which was
whether the plaintiff’s scholarship met the standards of the
university. 203 In explaining this conclusion, Judge Oberdorfer noted
that any grant of tenure to the plaintiff would require Vatican consent,
which would inevitably be based upon the consistency of her
scholarship with core teachings of the church. 204
In our view, the court properly raised the ministerial exception
sua sponte when it became clear that the dispute would turn on the
substance of the plaintiff’s writing and its consistency with church
teachings. It is not clear why the university failed to raise the
ministerial exception, but if the court had treated the defense as
waived and resolved the substance of the dispute, the court inevitably
would have violated the Establishment Clause. To resolve the
plaintiff’s claims, the court necessarily would have been required to
adjudicate the quality of the plaintiff’s scholarship about canon law, a
subject that, at least at this university, was a strictly ecclesiastical
matter. 205
In this respect, we think that Michael Helfand’s approach is
entirely wrong. Helfand contends that the ministerial exception is

EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 856 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994).
83 F.3d at 459.
203 Id. at 460.
204 856 F.Supp. at 9 (“It is possible for a court to compare the quantity of published
articles and, to some extent, the teaching evaluations. The issue decided by the
Canon Law Department, the School of Religious Studies, the Faculty Senate and,
ultimately, the Church authorities, necessarily involves the quality, and hence the
substance, of her work. That substance is materially religious. In reviewing actions
on most complex and technical subjects, a trier of fact chooses between competing
expert opinions. There are such competing expert opinions as to the quality and,
necessarily, the religious substance of Sister McDonough’s writings in this record. I
find and conclude that it is neither reasonably possible nor legally permissible for a
lay trier of fact to evaluate these competing opinions on religious subjects.”).
205 See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 134-39.
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designed solely to protect church autonomy. 206 On this view, there
should be no bar to adjudication of a strictly and purely ecclesiastical
question if both parties consent to its adjudication by a civil court. 207
As we have explained, we think that this view is inconsistent with both
longstanding Establishment Clause norms and the Court’s decision in
Hosanna-Tabor, which rests on those norms. 208 Establishment Clause
problems cannot be cured by the consent of the parties involved. For
example, it would violate the Clause to open a class at a public school
with prayer even if the teacher and every student present, as well as
their parents, consented to the practice. 209 Similarly, individual
litigants cannot consent to adjudication of a matter that the
Establishment Clause withdraws from the competence of a civil court.
III. CONCLUSION
As a matter of substantive constitutional law, Hosanna-Tabor
does not create the broad sphere of church autonomy that its biggest
proponents or opponents would suggest. Instead, it is a decision that
focuses solely on a specific set of questions that courts lack competence
to resolve. That statement of substantive law, however, masks a
potentially complicated set of procedural questions. The Court’s
conclusion that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense
rather than a jurisdictional bar is only the start of an appropriate
analysis about how to answer those questions.
As we have explained, courts should approach those procedural
questions in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial
exception. The exception reflects a longstanding constitutional
limitation on the competence of courts to resolve “strictly and purely
See Helfand, supra note 106, at 1923; supra at notes 106-112 and accompanying
text.
207 Id.
208 See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text.
209 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“Neither the fact that the prayer
may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of
which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite
different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.”); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 121, at 12122.
206
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ecclesiastical” questions. 210 To conclude that the exception operates as
an affirmative defense does not alter this fundamental limitation on
the authority of secular courts. Any other approach would be
unfaithful to this limitation.
As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between
religious institutions and their employees, courts may be required to
manage discovery to resolve threshold questions about the application
of the ministerial exception before permitting broader discovery.
Similarly, courts should consider permitting interlocutory appeals of
trial court decisions that deny motions for summary judgment based
on the exception. And courts not only should conclude that religious
institutions do not waive the defense by failing to raise it, but also
ought to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the exception
may apply. These departures from the ordinary treatment of
affirmative defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional
principles that the Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor.

210

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 733.
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